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1. Introduction
At first sight nothing can stand further apart than a contemporary secular philosopher and a fif-
teenth century cardinal of the Roman Church. The late László Tengelyi (1954–2014) was a pro-
fessor of philosophy, an insightful and creative interpreter of works from the phenomenological 
tradition – i.e. Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and many others –, while Nicholas 
of Cusa (1401–1464), who notably refused twice university professorship, was active in (church) 
politics instead, and at the same time proved to be a prolific author of works belonging to Neo-Pla-
tonic intellectual mysticism. Yet, beyond the mere fact that the former seriously studied the latter’s 
thought,2 there exists a deeper connection between these two thinkers, one that can be truly called 
phenomenological. It is the aim of the present paper to demonstrate – in the phenomenological 
sense – this connection.3
Therefore, I shall introduce my discussion with the help of some of Tengelyi’s phenomenological 
insights and then will briefly look at infinity in con temporary French phenomenology, while my 
second section is dedicated to an examination of some Cusanian works. The third section is my at-
tempt at a phenomenological evaluation of the Cusanian project, while in the closing section I will 
reflect on the possibility of philosophical humility. As I hope to make it clear, an alternative title of 
my paper could also be “On the humility of philosophy and the philosophy of humility”.
1 This paper is an extended written version of my presentation at the conference “Horizons Beyond 
Borders. Traditions and Perspectives of the Phenomenological Movement in Central and Eastern 
Europe” June 17–19th 2015, Budapest, Hungary.
 Herewith I should like to express my gratitude to Mark Webb, Anna Christina Soy Ribeiro and Jona-
than Dorsey at The College of Arts and Sciences of Texas Technical University, in Lubbock, Texas who 
made my stay there possible in the spring of 2015.  I am especially grateful to Professor Dorsey and 
their library staff for helping me to track down some of László Tengelyi’s articles.
 While this present paper has originally been composed in English, my earlier reflection, written in 
Hungarian on the relationship between Cusanus and phenomenology is to be published in the fol-
lowing volume: A vallásfilozófia új útjai. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2016. In spite of the same 
central topic and a considerable overlap in the material discussed, the Hungarian version and this 
English paper are markedly different.
2 Cf. e.g. Tengelyi lászló: On Absolute Infinity in Cantor, in Dermot Moran – Hans Reiner Sepp (eds.), 
Phenomenology 2010. Volume 4 Selected Essays from Northern Europe. Traditions, Transitions and 
Challenges (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2010) pp. 529–550. I have recently learnt from Mrs. Tengelyi, 
philosopher herself that her husband had even written one of his theses on Cusanus.
3 My entrance into phenomenology owes much to Tengelyi’s book Élettörténet és sorsesemény [Life 
History and Event] published in Hungarian in 1998 and also his Tapasztalat és kifejezés [Experience 
and Expression] in 2007, for an (extended and rewritten) English version of the former see his “The 
Wild Region in Life-History”, Northwestern University Press, Evenston, 2004.
22. Tengelyi and new phenomenology
Tengelyi certainly agrees with Husserlian phenomenology on its two basic  ten ets: phenomenology 
begins with the experience of the subject, i.e. the first person singular, while its aim is discovering 
structures and contexts of meanings. A basic difference, however, that sets Tengelyi apart from 
classical phenomenology is his fundamental conviction that the source of these meanings does not 
exclusively lie in the subject’s own activity. Meanings are not simply constituted by the subjects 
alone.
Instead, Tengelyi calls for a radically renewed and reformed or—in his terminology—diacritic 
phenomenology.4 He never ceases to emphasize his basic insight according to which experience 
is about something new, something surprising. A (new) meaning is always being born out of a 
non-controllable reality. Consequently, the world cannot be a self-contained whole, instead it 
stands radically open. As the late Husserl himself formulated it in the following question: 
“Does the ‘infinity’ of the world, instead of referring to a transfinite endlessness (as if 
the world were something finished in itself, an all-encompassing thing or a self-enclosed 
collectivity of things, which would nevertheless contain in itself an infinity of things), not 
rather mean an ‘openness’?” 5
One can also say that the infinite richness of experiencing objects and the world with its infinite 
possibilities of self-revealing is comparable to an unpredictable ocean. Thus, the infinity the Hun-
garian philosopher speaks about is certainly a dynamic kind of infinity.6 Clearly, for him, thinking, 
that is to say philosophizing itself is also a special kind of experience.
While experience and expression are equally important for diacritic phenomenology, the diacri-
tic phenomenology of religious experience can be called a road for the most part not taken. Thanks 
to his extensive reading Tengelyi is certainly aware of the theological dimensions of both pheno-
menology in general and infinity in particular, nevertheless, generally he seems to be somewhat rel-
4 As he himself acknowledges, the term diacritic comes from Merleau-Ponty, who in turn takes it from 
Saussure. Cf. lászló Tengelyi, “The Wild Region in Life-History”, op. cit., pp. xxvii–xxx, where he 
contrasts his way of thinking to Hegelian dialectic and traditional phenomenology. The philosophical 
term originates in Greek diakrinein (to distinguish, to divide, to separate) and refers to separating 
conceptually two aspects of being holding a differential relationship.
5 edmund Husserl, Ideen einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites 
Buch Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952) p. 299: 
“Besagt die »Unendlichkeit« der Welt statt einer transfiniten Unendlichkeit (als ob die Welt ein in 
sich fertig seiendes, ein allumfassendes Ding oder abgeschlossenen Kollektivum von Dingen wäre, 
das aber eine Unendlichkeit von Dingen in sich enthalte), besagt sie nicht vielmehr eine »Offen-
heit«?” I am grateful to my friend, Péter Sárkány, who made me possible to access this work.
 The English translation is quoted from lászló Tengelyi, “Agonistic World Projects: Transcendental-
ism Versus Naturalism”, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Volume 27, 2013/3, pp. 236–252, 
here p. 248. While the exact nature of this “openness” is left open in Husserl’s text, one can argue that 
Tengelyi’s project aims exactly at offering an answer to Husserl’s question: “Aber was soll damit ge-
meint sein?”  On the very same page in the previous paragraph Husserl speaks of the “open essence” 
(ein offenes Wesen) of a thing and finishes with the following question: “Aber das ist das Problem, 
den Sinn dieser Offenheit […] zu präzisieren.” (Author’s emphasis)
6 In several of his works, Tengelyi distinguishes between transfinite and absolute infinity, cf. my foot-
note 2 and also section 3 in my paper. On the problem of infinity and the world cf. his posthumous 
work: lászló Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit. Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik 
(Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2014) on the transfinite and openness see especially pp. 435–
548. Page 545 clearly states: “Husserl verwirft die Gleichsetzung der Welt mit einem in sich fertigem 
und allumfassendem Ding ebenso wie mit einem abgeschlossenen Kollektivum der Dinge.” Tenge-
lyi’s own diacritic phenomenology stands certainly for a dynamization [German Dynamisierung] of 
the infinite. I am grateful to Bence Marosán who made me possible to access this book.
3uctant to follow this path any further.7 As he clearly states: “With infinity beyond the thing and the 
world has a diacritic phenomenology as such nothing to do. Its task is solely to grasp the infinite 
of this world.”8 He even goes on to say that: “the infinity of the world is not equal to the absolutely 
infinite. Rather it is an open infinity, one that perhaps lays the basis to every kind of religious 
tradition, without, however, ever being able to be encapsulated by any of those in its entirety.”9
This last claim is especially interesting, for a number of reasons. First, in Georg Cantor’s and 
Husserl’s footsteps Tengelyi does not only clearly differentiates between the infinite of the world 
and God’s infinity, but in typical phenomenological fashion he leaves open the question of the exact 
nature of their mutual relationships. Secondly, although he seems to be aware of their importance, 
Tengelyi here does not take upon himself the task of investigating or evaluating any of the religious 
traditions. Thirdly, he carefully makes the rather humble claim that the infinite openness of the 
world may be fundamental to our understanding of religion.10 Finally, he also clearly differentiates 
between phenomenology and religion, that is to say, between the infinite of the world as studied in 
phenomenology and as experienced and interpreted through religion.
It might be pointed out that this last difference is again and perhaps not surprisingly of a diacri-
tic kind. For Tengelyi the two infinities—that of the world and that of God—appear to be at once 
different and as having an intimate relationship. Furthermore, it can be added that the diacritic 
relationship between experience and expression itself calls for an extension to the examination of 
phenomena such as narrative experience and sacred texts of religions, openness and prophetic ex-
perience, positive and negative theology – just to name a few.11
It is a well-known fact that Immanuel Kant attributed to the idea of infinity an exclusively regula-
tive function and denied to it any objective content.12 Yet, in Kant’s philosophical aftermath infinity 
has had a real come back. This is especially true in twentieth century French phenomenology.13 
7 See, for example, lászló Tengelyi, “On the Border of Phenomenology and Theology”, in Jonna Bor-
nemark, Hans Ruin (eds.), Phenomenology and Religion: New Frontiers (Huddinge: Södertörn Uni-
versity, 2010) pp. 17–34.
8 lászló Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, op. cit. p. 548: “Mit einem Unendlichen jenseits von Ding 
und Welt hat eine diakritische Phänomenologie als solche nichst zu tun. Ihr kommt es einzig und 
allein darauf an, das Unendliche dieser Welt zu erfassen.” (Author’s emphasis, my translation)
9 Ibid., p. 556: “Aber das Unendliche der Welt ist nicht das Absolutunendliche. Es ist vielmehr ein 
offenenes Unendliches, das vielleicht jeder Überlieferung religiöser Art zugrunde liegt, sich aber in 
keine von ihnen jemals ganz einschliessen lässt.”
10 This is all the more significant since the previous paragraph states the following: “jedes Gottesver-
hältnis des Menschen letzlich aus der Wahrnehmung des Unendlichen der Welt auswächst.” Ibid.
11 In my reading Merleau-Ponty’s following words seem to have already opened up this possibility: 
“Should the starting-point for the understanding of history be ideology, or politics, or religion, or 
economics? […] All these views are true provided that they are not isolated, that we delve deeply 
into history and reach the unique core of existential meaning which emerges in each perspective.” 
See maurice merleau-PonTy, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) 
Preface, p. xix. I shall come back to the question of a (diacritic) phenomenology of religion when 
evaluating Cusanus’ thought from a phenomenological perspective in section 3.
12 Cf. lászló Tengelyi, “Experience and Infinity in Kant and Husserl”, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, (67/3) 
2005/3, pp. 479–500. It is worth noting that before turning to phenomenology Tengelyi studied 
Kant, and he even published a monograph on Kant’s philosophy. (See lászló Tengelyi, Kant (Buda-
pest: Áron, 1995.) The thinker from Königsberg has always remained one of Tengelyi’s interests.
 Tengelyi himself confessed: “I have two interests stemming from the problem of infinity. The first is 
an attempt to unite or connect my two main interests, namely, Kant and phenomenology. […] On 
the other hand, this threefold interest in Kant, Husserl, and Cantor is also integrated within my 
project on a new phenomenology in France. […] it is connected with an attempt to develop phe-
nomenology as a new kind of first philosophy. This is the main project of Marion, which, I believe, 
must be taken seriously but should be interpreted modestly”. See niall Kean, VincenT Wargo (eds.), 
“Interview with Professor Tengelyi”, The Leuven Philosophy Newsletter, volume 14, 2005, pp. 47–54, 
quote on p.49.
13 As a significant part of his essays makes it clear—in contributions discussing but also further devel-
oping the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, Michel Henry, Marc Richir—
contemporary French phenomenology was an important field for Tengelyi’s research. In 2005 he 
4According to Emmanuel Levinas infinity in a certain sense can be experienced in the face of the 
Other.14 As Bettina Bergo puts it:
”insofar as Infinity means the not-finite, it refers to the unmasterable quality of human 
expression. So far as Infinity has a positive sense, then it has the affective qualities of 
desire for sociality, and of joy. Thus, Infinity, before we interpret it as “God” or reify it as 
a highest being, is a quotidian event that takes place at the sensuous-affective level, and 
repeats.”15
Thus for Levinas it is the ethical experience that gives us phenomenal indi-
cation of the Infinite. The experience of life plays a similar role for Michel 
Henry, while Jean-Luc Marion refers to the experience of the invisible. Although clearly in diffe-
rent concepts and phenomena, all of these three thinkers seem to point toward the infinite. Even 
at first sight Infinity, Life, and the Invisible are – at least (partly) – coextensive concepts. Certainly 
all three lie beyond Husserlian phenomenology as well as beyond a neutral theoretical attitude. 
Interestingly enough already for Edmund Husserl the finite and the infinite belonged together.16 
Notably, for him phenomenology necessarily held a relation to the infinite.17
3. Infinity in Nicholas of Cusa’s works
3.1. De docta ignorantia (1440)
As Tengelyi was himself aware, Husserl’s differentiation between two basic kinds of infinite came 
from the mathematician Georg Cantor.18 Cantor’s own distinction was at least foreshadowed con-
ceptually in Nicholas of Cusa’s famous De docta ignorantia.19 While for Cusanus the world is inter-
minatum, privative infinitum, i.e. having no definable borders and privatively infinite, God is truly 
Infinite, i.e. interminabilis, infinitum.20 Although the world is finite, its boundaries cannot be fixed 
made the following statement: “My present research concerns what you could describe as the new 
phenomenology in France, a phenomenology that has been developed over the last two decades. The 
main problem here, formulated by Jean-Luc Marion, is the search for a third form of phenomenol-
ogy, which is different both from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s approaches. The main thesis developed 
by Marion is that there is a third form of phenomenology scattered over the landscape of French 
thought since the 60ies.” See niall Kean, VincenT Wargo (eds), ”Interview with Professor Tengelyi”, 
op.cit., p. 48.
 An important fruit of this research in this respect is Hans-dieTer gondeK, lászló Tengelyi (eds.), Neue 
Phänomenologie in Frankreich (Berlin: Surhkamp, 2011) – a book I was not able to access while 
writing the present paper. For a much shorter overview see lászló Tengelyi, “New Phenomenology in 
France”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 50, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 295–303.
14 See emmanuel leVinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay in Exteriority (The Hague/Boston/London: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).
15 BeTTina Bergo, “Emmanuel Levinas”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, Summer 2015 Edition, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/
levinas/>. Cf. also lászló Tengelyi, “Experience of Infinity in Levinas”, Levinas Studies: An Annual 
Review, Volume 4, 2009, pp. 111–125. For the rest of my paper I adopt the spelling “Infinity” and 
“Infinite” whenever it unequivocally refers to absolute infinity or God.
16 Tengelyi points outs this connection in several of his works. On the mathematician Georg Cantor, 
whose assistant was Husserl, see lászló Tengelyi, On Absolute Infinity in Cantor, op.cit. 
17 Cf. lászló Tengelyi, “Experience and Infinity”, op. cit. 
18 On Cantor see lászló Tengelyi, “On Absolute Infinity in Cantor”, op. cit. 
19 Henceforward referred to as DI.
20 DI II 1,97. For the critical text with English and German translation see http://www.cusanus-portal.
de/ (accessed 17.03.2015.)
5with absolute exactness. Creation based on matter is always and necessarily in potentiality, thus in 
principle it can be otherwise and its boundaries cannot be settled for good. However, God is posi-
tively Infinite: God’s Transcendence cannot be defined and captured by finite concepts, precisely 
because God is Infinite.
Clearly, in this work Cusanus speaks as a thinker who is very much indebted to our Western me-
taphysical tradition. In book two of his DI his reasons for thinking the world otherwise and anew is 
a clear departure from fundamental medieval ideas, yet his thought—both in its methodology and 
content—is based on metaphysical speculation rather than on the anticipation of the experimental 
method of modern science.21 In many respects, “a new spirit, the spirit of Renaissance breathes in 
the work of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. His world is no longer the medieval cosmos. But it is not 
yet, by any means, the infinite universe of the moderns.”22
One finds perhaps the most important phenomenological aspect of his thought in his reluctance 
to form an objectively valid representation of the universe.23 For Nicholas the world-image of any 
given observer (diversae imaginationes) is made principally and fundamentally relative through 
his or her own place and movement within the universe, and as a consequence “the world and its 
motion and shape cannot be apprehended.”24 In is his own distinctive fashion Nicholas claims that 
the ancients did not arrive at these conclusions concerning the world, precisely because they lacked 
learned ignorance (docta ignorantia).25 Thus, philosophical humility in the form of self-reflection 
and constant awareness of the limitation of one’s own thinking appears here as a possible link to 
modern phenomenology.
3.2. De visione Dei (1453)
I have no intention of pressing the previous point too far. Since the DI is undoubtedly a very spe-
culative text, in order to make a more suitable connection to phenomenology it is advisable to take 
other Cusanian works into consideration. The De visione Dei presents itself as a particularly good 
choice, because its speculative content is explicitly rooted in personal experience.26 This work was 
written for a Benedictine community, at Saint Quirinus Abbey, Tegernsee, in Bavaria. It is an in-
tellectual introduction to mystical theology. In Cusanian terminology it is a manuductio: this term 
emphasizes the anagogic function of knowledge.27 Cusanus originally attached a painting of an 
omnivoyant face, one that he calls a picture of Infinity (figura infinitatis), to his manuscript in or-
der that the monks’ meditation could start with the experience of actually looking at this painting.28
The DVD can be read as an analysis of the intuitive knowledge presupposed by Infinity. Our 
knowledge of the Infinite is paradoxical: Infinity can only exist unconditionally, but our access to 
it is necessarily conditional. This is the paradox Cusanus wrestles with. The paradox is essentialy-
ly connected to a point highlighted by medieval knowledge: one may see the invisible within and 
21 On Nicholas’ cosmology see alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968) pp. 5–24.
22 Ibid., pp. 23–24.
23 Cf. ibid., p. 16.
24 DI II 11, 161:12-13: “vides mundum et eius motum atque figuram attingi non posse”, translation from 
Hopkins, see http://www.cusanus-portal.de/ (accessed 121.03.2015.)
25 DI II 12, 162:3-4: “Ad ista iam dicta veteres non attigerunt, quia in docta ignorantia defecerunt.”
26 The title of this book refers both to the vision whose subject is God (genitivus subjectivus: God’s 
seeing,) and the vision aiming at God (genitivus objectivus: seeing God). Henceforth I shall refer 
to this work as DVD. For the Latin text with English translation see JasPer HoPKins (transl. and ed.), 
Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism. Text, Translation and Interpretative Study of De Visione 
Dei (Minneapolis: Banning, 19882).
27 On the term and Nicholas’ manuductive concern see the successive examination of such important 
Cusanian works as De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, De visione dei, De deo abscondito, De pos-
sest and De Non-Aliud in gergely BaKos, Faith, Rationality, op.cit. pp. 149–196.
28 This starting point is not only phenomenological, but it also brings the DVD into close proximity to 
philosophical praxis.
6through the visible, one may grasp the Infinite in the finite.29 The twentieth century French pheno-
menologist, Marion in his own works on painting raises a similar question: How to be a theologian 
and remain a phenomenologist at the same time? That is to ask how to steer a safe course between 
the Scylla of a non-phenomenological metaphysics and the Charybdis of a phenomenology of 
mere immanence?30
Generally, for medievals the visio Dei in question was not understood as a sort of (para)psycho-
logical experience in the first place. For Cusanus himself it can be certainly realized in the experi-
ence of thinking. If he can be called a mystical thinker, his mysticism is an intellectual one. In his 
thought as manuductio Cusanus leads the believer from the sensible to the intelligible, and from 
the intelligible to the unfathomable mystery of the Godhead.31 As he himself says in his Prologue to 
the DVD:
”I will attempt to lead you–by way of experiencing and through a very simply and com-
mon means–into most sacred darkness. Upon arriving there each of you […] will appro-
ach even nearer.”32
Cusanus’ emphasis on experience (experiamentaliter) and on the sobriety of his own reflection 
(simplicissimo atque communissimo modo) already reveals a certain affinity with phenomenology. 
However, this is only the reader’s starting point towards the sacred darkness (sacratissima obscu-
ritas) of the Divinity, that is to say, towards a mystical vision of the Divine. The lines quoted from 
the Prologue also intimate that the intellectual path offered towards God will still be a path of (in-
tellectual) desire.
The title of Chapter 13 makes clear that “God is seen to be absolute infinity.”33 Seeing this infinite 
cannot be an ordinary way of seeing for the finite subject, since God clearly stands beyond all visible 
objects.34 Yet, on the other hand, God’s transcendence as Infinity cannot be a mere transcendent 
transcendence. Necessarily, Infinity does have a connection to the finite, to every aspect of finite 
being.35 As Cusanus explains:
”I see that You are Infinity itself. And so, there is not anything that is other than you or 
different from You or opposed to You. For Infinity is not compatible with otherness, be-
cause there is not anything outside it, since it is Infinity. For Absolute Infinity includes 
and encompasses all things. And so, if there were ”Infinity” and something outside it, 
29 Cf. Jos decorTe, “Sapientia: Between Superbia and Vanitas”, in Stephen F. Brown (ed.), Meeting of 
the Minds. The Relations between Mediaeval and Classical Modern European Philosophy (Turn-
hout: Brepols, 1998) pp. 477–506; id., Eine kurze Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie (Pa-
derborn: Schöningh, 2006) pp. 12–18; id., “Geschichte und Eschatologie. Vom Nutzen und Nachteil 
der Historie für das mittelalterliche Leben”, in Jan Aertsen, Martin Pickavé (eds.), Ende und Vollend-
ung: Eschatologische Perspektiven im Mittelalter (Berlin: de Guyter, 2002) pp. 150–161.
 See also gergely BaKos, On Faith, Rationality, op. cit. pp. 3–29. For the biblical origins of visio Dei 
see Romans 1:19-20; 1 Corinthians 13:9–12 and the Gospel according to John.
30 Cf. Jean-luc marion, The Crossing of the Visible (California: Stanford University Press, 2005)
31 Jos decorTe, “Ter inleiding”, in Jos Lievens (transl.), Nicolaas van Cusa: Godsdienstvrede (Kapellen: 
Pelckmans, 2000) pp. 7–46, here p. 36.
32 DVD Prologue 1:8-10.
33 DVD 13, 52:2: ”Quod Deus videtur absoluta infinitas.”
34 Cf. ibid. 52:4-5: „nescio quid video, quia nihil visibilium video. Et hoc scio solum, quia scio nescire 
quid video et numquam scire posse.”
35 Bence Marosán drew my attention to the fact that the existence of Evil and pantheism pose a prob-
lem to Cusanus’ position. It should be noted, however, that Nicholas is denying neither God’s free 
creative act nor the work of salvation. As regards pantheism, he actually faced its charge already in 
his lifetime. Yet, in his works there is no trace of a necessary relation from God towards the world 
in the sense of a deterministic causation or emanation. Infinity’s relation to the finite is necessarily 
intimate, but still free and in no way fully deterministic. This is especially clear with respect to human 
creativity.
7there would be neither Infinity nor anything else. […] if the Infinite is removed, nothing 
remains.”36
Consequently, the human subject, precisely as a finite being, has a necessary connection to Infi-
nity. Before coming to know any finite alterity (alteritas) or other (aliud), the Infinite must be 
posited or rather it posits itself.
For Cusanus alteritas or aliud are relative terms, since the otherness they refer to comes from 
non-being. Clearly, this kind concept of Otherness is not a positive principle (principium positi-
vum), while Infinity is. To this Infinity nothing is other or alien. Infinity is not limited by anything 
else, i.e. by anything finite. It is not difficult to see the consequence of this position in a radically ne-
gative theology: Infinity has no proper name, since all names presuppose finite reality, otherness, 
difference and limitation.37 Yet, on the other hand, because nothing is alien or other to Infinity, it 
can still be approached from within finitude.
3.3. De directio speculantis seu de li Non Aliud
However distant the Cusanian employment of the concept of otherness may pre-
sent itself to contemporary phenomenology, in this respect it is worthwhi-
le to look at another Cusanian manuductio under the title On God as Non- 
Other.38 This text was completed before January 18th in 1462, just a few years before Nicholas’ 
death. This late work is explicitly Dionysian. It identifies God as the Non-Other (li Non Aliud). In 
clear contrast to Levinas, for Nicholas Non-Other does refer to God’s transcendence, or to be more 
precise, to God’s transcendence and immanence at the same time. One can say that God as Infinite 
has both a negative and a positive dimension.39 Again, it should be noted that while Cusanus takes 
Divine transcendence rather seriously, God’s immanence opens up epistemological possibilities for 
the human subject. I shall look at this issue more closely in the next section.
4. Towards a Phenomenological Overview of the Cusanian Project
With respect to Cusanus and phenomenological philosophy there are at least three basic points to 
be considered.40
4.1. The absolute is ultimately beyond human knowledge.
After Husserl’s famous dictum “The infinite is not a phenomenon.” this can be hardly disputed. 
This is an obvious and rather important point of agreement between Nicholas and the phenomen-
ological tradition. Perhaps, this should not come as a surprise, since numerous thinkers from the 
36 Ibid. 56:1-6.10.
37 Cf. DVD 13, 52:12-14; and 14, 60:3-5.
38 For the Latin text with English translation see JasPer HoPKins (transl.), Nicholas of Cusa on God as 
Not–Other. A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1979)
39 If I understand Balázs Mezei’s criticism of Levinas rightly, the problem with Levinasian infinite lies 
precisely in its limited nature. This squares well with the Cusanian position that thinks infinity as 
not-other.
40 These points are taken from deTHlef THiel, “Nicolaus of Cusa (1401–1464). Squaring the Circle: Pol-
itics, Piety, and Rationality”, in Paul Richard Blum (ed.), Philosophies of the Renaissance (Washing-
ton D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010) pp. 43–56. However, Thiel’s essay makes 
no manifest connection to phenomenology.
8phenomenological tradition could appreciate aspects of negative or mystical theology–a tradition 
Nicholas is consciously inscribing his entire oeuvre into.41
4.2. Human knowledge is necessarily provisional or asymptotic.
Negatively, this is a reminder of our human limitations or—to employ a medieval term—of humility 
(humilitas). To express the same point positively one can say that it opens up an infinite horizon 
for endless investigation. Again and rather obviously the same basic structure presents itself in 
phenomenological philosophy: an infinite field of possible research shown in the manifold new 
“phenomenologies”, but notably also a phenomenological philosophy of religion.
4.3. Human knowledge has an analogical or manuductive function.
Admittedly, at least at first sight this third point seems to be problematic from a phenomenologi-
cal perspective.42 However, I maintain that precisely a phenomenological description of the actual 
functioning of religious texts, concepts, symbols, actions, etc. could profit a lot from the Cusanian 
manuductiones.43
Here it is perhaps worthwhile to remind the reader of the necessary starting point both of pheno-
menology and Cusanian thought: the perspective of the first person singular. As it has been shown, 
Nicholas‘ DVD begins with the experience of an omnivoyant face and goes on to discuss how one 
should approach it and how each monk ought to take into account of the experience of the others in 
this exercise. In this way (inter-)subjective experience forms the starting point of this speculative 
work.44
On the other hand, while considering Nicholas’ manuductive concern, the symbolic structure of 
medieval, indeed of all religious knowledge should also be kept in mind. According to this structure 
(S – X – Y), for the finite subject (S) the visible (X) points toward an invisible (Y). Note that X is 
only a similitudo of Y, that is to say X is both similar and dissimilar to Y at the same time. Consequ-
ently, God will always remain a hidden God (deus absconditus). The presence of Y can only be a 
presence in absence. This symbolic absence of the absolute is at once its symbolic presence – and 
vice versa.45
This can hardly be called a metaphysics of presence, but more rightly a metaphysics of a presen-
ce in absence. To employ a German term one can say that it is a Zusammenspiel of presence and 
absence. Moreover, the same basic moment of (dis)similarity and thus presence-in-absence also 
structures the following phenomena: humor, the ethical, human relationships and art. In this res-
pect one can be reminded of the so called ”theological  turn” in French phenomenology: especially 
41 Cf., for example, BeTTina Bergo, Emmanuel Levinas, op.cit.: “Levinas stands, minimally, within the 
negative ‘theological’ tradition inaugurated by Maimonides; more acutely, perhaps, because Levi-
nas’s task is not so much to reconcile Judaism and Aristotelianism, as it is to describe phenome-
nologically the indescribable: breaking out of totality and Being.” As regards negative or mystical 
theology similar connections can be pointed out on Derrida’s, Heidegger’s and Marion’s behalf.
42 Cf. lászló Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, op.cit., p. 548. See the quotation in section 2 of my pa-
per, cf. footnote 8.
43 Examples from the DVD are the omnivoyant face, the mirror, the painter, the wall of Paradise. For 
an analysis of some of these, see gergely TiBor BaKos, “The Mirror, the Painter and Infinity. Images 
and Concepts in the Manuductive Strategy of De visione Dei”, in Inigo Bocken, Harald Schwaetzer 
(eds.), Spiegel und Porträt. Zur Bedeutung zweier zentraler Bilder im Denken des Nicolas Cusanus 
(Maastricht: Shaker, 2005) pp. 231–246.
44 Cf. DVD Prologue, 2:1–5.
45 My understanding of the symbolic structure comes from Jos decorTe, Raak me niet aan, Kapellen: 
Pelckmans, 2001. The nuanced concept of a metaphysics of a presence in absence I also owe to De-
corte.
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Tengelyi’s own phenomenological project, one is reminded of diacritic difference, that is to say a 
difference with connection.
Diacritic phenomenology for Tengelyi also means that one can never understand experience as 
it were from the outside. To put it with Levinas, there is no possibility of a panoramic, totalizing 
vision. I think, Cusanus would basically agree: the human subject is not in a position to form a total, 
objective, scientific picture of the world—let alone of God.
A further basic factor of diacritic difference, namely temporality may need another essay.47 Yet, 
Cusanus’s whole oeuvre testifies to his awareness of the fundamentally provisional character of our 
human knowledge. Phenomenol ogically speaking any awareness of a provisional dimension neces-
sarily includes—even if only in an implicit manner—an awareness of temporality, i.e. of the passage 
of time. Notably, Nicholas never built a closed system of thought, instead he made fresh starts with 
every one of his books. Thus if Tengelyi’s work can be characterized as a practice of diacritic phen-
omenology, I suggest that Nicholas’s might just as well be called a diacritic practice of (mystical) 
theology. This is not meant as a definite statement on the issue at hand, rather as an invitation to a 
further investigation and deeper comparison of phenomenology and Cusanian thought.
5. Towards the humility of philosophy  
and the philosophy of humility
Although famously and fiercely criticized by Friedrich Nietzsche, humility appears as a deeply va-
lued virtue not only in most religious traditions but notably also in Kantian moral philosophy. In 
the form of modesty it is still to be recommended. I maintain that the entire phenomenological 
movement has been aiming to achieve excellence in this virtue in its constant effort to understand 
our human condition.48
Although different in form and content, and most fundamentally in its inspiration, medieval 
humility runs a parallel course—certainly it did so for Nicholas of Cusa. If one is bold enough to 
combine these two concerns, that is to say the consequent intellectual modesty of phenomenology 
and Cusanian humilitas, this endeavor does not appear as a sign of intellectual hybris, but on the 
contrary it aims at a deeper realization of both.
In this respect medieval examples of vision can certainly help us further. Rogier van der Weyden 
(1400–1464) was a medieval painter also mentioned by Cusanus in the DVD.49  One of his works, 
the central panel of the so called Braque Family Triptych painted around 1450 shows the figure of 
46 It is still to be seen to what extent BeTTina Bergo’s following evaluation should be qualified: “The 
hyperbolic language of Otherwise than Being would have us ‘sense’ the excess of what he means 
to express—and its limit. This is not allegory; that is, it is not the signification, born of a Chris-
tian reading of the Bible, of higher realities hidden under everyday objects and events. It is almost 
the contrary: signification has its incipience in transcendence; transcendence is the intersubjective 
quality of sensibility.” (id., Emmanuel Levinas, op.cit.) In my view, the right understanding of the 
problem depends upon the exact nature of allegory. Without going into a detailed discussion here, it 
can be simply stated that symbols always suggest an ever possible surplus of meaning.
47 Cf. lászló Tengelyi, “The Wild Region in Life-History”, op. cit., p. xxix: “a diacritical difference be-
comes manifest only in a temporal shift.”
48 Cf. maurice merleau-PonTy, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., pp. xvi-xvii: “The world is not 
what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in com-
munication with it; I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible.” These words do not only ring with true 
intellectual modesty, but they also shed light on the essential connection between humility and the 
perception of infinity.
 See also ibid. p. xiv: “The most important lesson of which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility 
of a complete reduction.”; and p. xii: “I discover within myself a kind of internal weakness standing 
in the way of my totally individualized: a weakness which exposes me to the gaze of others as a man 
among men or at least as a consciousness among consciousnesses.”
49 DVD Prologue 2:8-9.
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an omnivoyant Christ flanked by the Blessed Virgin and John the Baptist.50 This painting is a clear 
testimony of Christian faith and a strong reminder that the vision aimed at by the medieval intel-
lectual is embraced by a Divine vision—themes central to Nicholas’ DVD.
Yet, as Cusanus also makes clear, the spectacle of omnivoyance is far from being limited to the 
strictly religious or the theological. In the DVD Nicholas reminds his Benedictine readership of the 
many existing instances of such images—i.e. the archer in the forum at Nuremberg, a face in the city 
hall of Brussels, Veronica at his own chapel at Coblenz and the angel 
holding the emblems of the church in his castle at Bressanone.51
Thus it should not come as a surprise that another work by the 
hands of the same Rogier – entitled the Portrait of a Young Woman 
or Lady Wearing a Gauze Headdress, completed between 1435–1440 
– likewise gives testimony to the popularity such images were enjoy-
ing in the Middle Ages.52 While the face of the omnivoyant Christ may 
stand symbolically for medieval—and a fortiori for Cusanian—visio 
Dei, the young lady depicted by the Flemish painter may just as well 
be a symbol of our phenomenological concern for the human Other.
In concluding his posthumous work on phenomenological me-
taphysics, László Tengelyi expresses—albeit somewhat tentatively—
the following philosophical conviction: “ultimately, every human 
relationship with the Divine grows out of the awareness of the infi-
nity of the world.”53 New phenomenology demonstrates that serious 
philosophical reflection on infinity brings us back to the trinity of 
classical metaphysics, Christian Wolff’s metaphysische Trinität. Yet, 
undoubtedly, each member of this metaphysical trinity is seen now in 
a different and new light than before—thanks to phenomenological awareness. It appears that the 
world, God and the human Other—these fundamental concepts are not only passing moments of 
the Western metaphysical tradition still haunting our thinking, but they will continue to confront 
and challenge phenomenological philosophy as well. Cusanus and Tengelyi offer us a rich soil out 
of which our own efforts at understanding these concepts could grow.
50 Presently on permanent display at the Louvre, in Paris, France. Cf. http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.
html?/html/w/weyden/rogier/10braque/index.html (accessed 21.11.2015.) I am grateful to my 
friend, Zoltán Csordás for helping me to track down this picture and identify its artist and also for the 
correct interpretation of Rogier’s paintings.
51 Cf. DVD Prologue 2:1-10. The list is not meant to be exhaustive as it is finished with the following 
close: ”et multae alie undique.”
52 Currently this picture is at the Gemäldegarie, in Berlin, Germany. Cf. http://www. 
wikiart .org/en/rogier-van-der-weyden/braque-family-tr iptych-1450#supersized- 
artistPaintings-187278 (accessed 18.11.2015)
53 lászló Tengelyi, Welt und Unendlichkeit, op. cit., p. 556: “jedes Gottesverhältnis des Menschen letz-
tlich aus der Wahrnehmung des Unendlichen der Welt auswächst.” As the previous page makes it 
clear, Tengelyi does not exclude the possibility of a theological reflection on this relationship.
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For any such intellectual endeavor it is advisable to consider Jos Decorte’s following reflection 
on the symbolic experience laid out above:
“In this sort of experience man looks intently towards the horizon to make out roughly 
the outlines of the House [i.e. the House of the Father, a biblical image of the final my-
sterious goal of human existence]—being aware that this can never be wholly done, in 
truth, it may never be accomplished fully. While being aware of his finality, he certainly 
avoids the foolishness of pride and the nonsense of vanity and finds thus true wisdom: 
that of humility.”54
This awareness—when achieved and sustained in our own philosophical practice—will be the true 
guarantee for philosophical humilitas: a deep concern connecting Cusanian and phenomenological 
thinking.55 Only then could we venture into developing a philosophy of humility: we can start re-
flecting philosophically on the true meaning of our humility. It is my conviction, that ultimately, no 
phenomenology true to its name can be satisfied with anything less than that.
54 Jos decorTe, “Middeleeuwse en hedendaagse appreciatie van de liefdesmystiek”, Tijdschrift voor Fi-
losofie 63 (2001) pp. 543–68, here p. 567.
55 Cf. maurice merleau-PonTy, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. xxi: “The unfinished nature of 
phenomenology and the inchoative atmosphere which has surrounded it are not to be taken as a 
sign of failure, they were inevitable because phenomenology’s task was to reveal the mystery of the 
world and of reason.”
